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Over the course of the two years following the Arab 
Spring, numerous States in the region have engaged 
in processes of revising their constitutions, some-
times even going as far as drawing up an entirely 
new text. Even countries not having undertaken pro-
cesses of transition have often been subject to per-
sistent pressure from opposition movements, who 
demand they grant – if only symbolically – a certain 
political liberalisation. The contrast with the past is 
great, since even though nearly all Arab countries 
had a constitution or a basic law, with the notorious 
exception of Libya under Gaddafi, the political au-
thoritarianism characterising the entire region en-
tailed a constitutional inertia that had hardly been 
broken except to allow a president to aspire to ad-
ditional terms in office or to modify the provisions 
governing accession to office.
The transitions underway are characterised by the le-
gal and, more specifically, constitutional dimension 
that the different actors on the political scene lend 
this political change. Everywhere, the political impera-
tives have thus crystallised around the constitutional 
reference. As the legal text containing the basic prin-
ciples on which the political and legal order of the 
State rest, the constitution has become a symbol for 
all political positions. In an attempt to influence the 
content of the texts being drawn up or revised, the 
different political forces in play make use of the legal 
norms to build or strengthen their political legitimacy. 
The ability of the different actors to introduce provi-
sions in accordance with their ideology and concep-
tion of society is dependent upon the balance of 
forces involved. By the same token, the constitutional 
debate impassions the populations that have over-
thrown their leaders, who appropriate it by organising 
protests, public debates, conferences, radio and TV 
programmes or lengthy analyses in newspapers.
The constitutional debate has revolved around the 
common aspiration of populations for greater de-
mocracy. Among the protesters’ demands, the points 
almost all of them had in common were a call for real 
separation and balance of powers, the expansion 
and guarantee of individual liberties, the independ-
ence of the judiciary branch, free elections and the 
struggle against corruption. The monarchies seem 
to have fared better than the republics in the protest 
and demands movements. Very few of them were 
faced with demands for the establishment of a con-
stitutional monarchy, let alone a republic, the pro-
testers most often merely demanding a reduction in 
the sovereign’s powers to the benefit of a potential 
Prime Minister and the strengthening of the legisla-
tive branch, until then devoid of any real power.
Though all the States of the Arab world have been 
confronted with revolutionary movements and calls 
for reform, the scope of constitutional changes un-
dertaken or underway is variable, and only some of 
them have initiated a genuine process of constitu-
tional reform. Some of them have done so at the fall 
of the preceding regime and have embarked upon 
the development of a new text (Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, 
Yemen). Others have prudently preferred to begin a 
process of reform to defuse the risks of political rup-
ture (Morocco, Jordan). In the end, the majority have 
merely conceded superficial reforms (Oman, Qatar, 
Transitions in the Arab World
Constitutional Reforms in Arab 
Countries in Transition
* This article was finalised before July 2013 (Editor's note).
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Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Syria and Algeria, for in-
stance), the majority of oil monarchies using their 
wealth to buy social peace by redistributing part of it 
among the population.
revolutionary Processes and Constitutional 
Change
Following a revolutionary process having led to the 
fall of their presidents, certain countries have chosen 
to break with the preceding regime by abolishing 
their constitutions and engaging in the process of 
drawing up a new constitutional text. This is the case 
in Egypt and Tunisia, as well as Libya and Yemen, 
who are following or have followed different meth-
ods in drawing up their new constitutions.
Different Paces of Progress
Egypt is the farthest along, since it has already 
adopted and implemented its new constitution. Tuni-
sia has taken a long time to draw up its constitution 
and its adoption is expected for the autumn of 2013 
instead of October 2012. Insofar as Libya and 
Yemen, who also ousted their presidents, they have 
merely postulated drafting it. In Libya, a Constitu-
tional Declaration adopted in August of 2011 by the 
National Transitional Council established a transition 
period during which an elected assembly, the Gen-
eral National Congress, would appoint a new gov-
ernment and the members of a constituent assem-
bly. The process would conclude with the adoption 
of the constitution by referendum and the holding of 
legislative and presidential elections. In March 2012, 
a constitutional amendment established that the 
Congress, once elected, would appoint a constitu-
ent commission made up of 60 members, with parity 
between the country’s three main regions (Tripolita-
nia, Cyrenaica, Fezzan). But under pressure from the 
opposition, on 5 July 2012, that is, two days before 
the legislative elections were to be held, the Nation-
al Transitional Council decided to modify the August 
2011 Constitutional Declaration such that the con-
stituent assembly would no longer be appointed but 
elected, according to the criteria to be established 
by the General National Congress (GNC), with re-
spect for the principle of representation of all com-
ponents of Libyan society in its cultural and linguistic 
diversity. Moreover, the assembly would have three 
months to submit its project. After lengthy debate, 
on 6 February 2013, the GNC decided not to amend 
the Constitutional Declaration again but to validate 
the appointment of Constituent Assembly members 
by holding an election. The different political forces 
involved were unable to reach an agreement as to 
the voting method, so, the GNC designated a com-
mittee of three members representing the country’s 
three main regions, which was entrusted with reach-
ing a consensus.
In Yemen, a National Dialogue Conference bringing 
together the different political groups has been in 
session since 18 March 2013 under the auspices of 
the United Nations in order to draw up a new consti-
tution and prepare legislative and presidential elec-
tions, to be held in 2014. Yemen has requested 
France’s support in the process of drawing up its 
new constitution.
Similarities in Transition Phase Management
In Egypt, the 1971 Constitution was suspended in 
February 2011 by the Supreme Council of the Arm-
ed Forces (SCAF), to which President Mubarak had 
just transferred his powers, and has never been rein-
stated. In Tunisia, the decision to suspend the 1959 
Constitution did not come until March 2011, after 
presidential powers had been temporarily attributed 
to the President of the Chamber of Deputies, as 
constitutionally stipulated in the case of a definitive 
vacancy of the office of President of the republic. It 
was definitively abolished in December 2011 by the 
constitutional law on the provisional organisation of 
the government. In both countries, a provisional text 
has been adopted to regulate the transition period. 
In Egypt, it was the armed forces that drafted this 
document, under particularly obscure, chaotic con-
ditions. Hence, after having taken power in the most 
perfect illegality, since, according to the 1971 Con-
stitution, the President of the Lower House of Par-
liament should have taken the office of interim 
President and not the SCAF, the latter appointed a 
revision committee and on 19 March 2011, submit-
ted a dozen constitutional amendments to referen-
dum vote, essentially relative to electoral processes, 
which were adopted by an overwhelming majority of 
77.2%. But on 30 March 2011, the 1971 Constitu-
tion, which had been suspended and just amended, 
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was replaced by a Constitutional Declaration pro-
claimed by the SCAF, which included some fifty 
stipulations from the 1971 Constitution as well as 
the amended articles that had been adopted by ref-
erendum. This document, however, was not submit-
ted to a referendum by the people.
In Tunisia, the preparation of a text designed to gov-
ern the transition period was at first – in January 
2011 – entrusted to the High Commission for Politi-
cal Reform and Democratic Transition, a technical 
body comprised by experts that, renamed as of Feb-
ruary 2011 as the “High Commission for the Realisa-
tion of the Goals of the Revolution, Political Reform 
and Democratic Transition,” passed a decree-law in 
March 2011 on the provisional organisation of the 
government designed to regulate the transition peri-
od. Then, in December 2011, the constituent assem-
bly replaced said text by a constitutional law on the 
provisional organisation of the government, dubbed 
the “Little Constitution,” which established the or-
ganisational principles of the State’s political admin-
istration during the transition period.
In Egypt as in Tunisia, the opposition attempted, in 
vain, to limit the powers of the future constituent as-
sembly by adopting a text of a “supra-constitutional” 
nature containing a certain number of safeguards. In 
Egypt, the army, supported by the liberal and left-
wing parties, twice attempted – in July and Novem-
ber of 2011 – to impose a declaration of principles 
establishing guidelines for the future constituent as-
sembly by proclaiming, in particular, the “civilian” na-
ture of the Egyptian State, freedom of religion and 
gender equality, and guaranteeing the armed forces 
an important role. But in the face of protest by Islam-
ist parties, the SCAF backed down and cancelled 
the text. In Tunisia, it was the High Commission that 
adopted a Republican Pact on 1 July 2011, contain-
ing a number of fundamental principles such as Arti-
cle 1 of the former constitution, relative to the role of 
Islam, the separation of politics and religion, the 
freedom of conscience and religion, the principle of 
the equality of citizens, the preservation of the ac-
quis of Tunisian women in the sphere of personal 
status or the separation of the legislative and execu-
tive branches, and the independence of the judiciary 
(and prohibiting any normalisation of relations with 
Israel). However, this text not being adopted by ref-
erendum, the constituent assembly considered it 
had no binding legal effect.
Differences in the Drafting Process of the New 
Constitutions
Egypt and Tunisia diverged insofar as the stages of 
the institutional transition process. Should the peo-
ple or the institutions be changed first? The Egyptian 
Constitutional Declaration of 30 March 2011 was 
particularly ambiguous on this point and its interpre-
tation entailed conflicts, at times even violent ones, 
between the different forces involved. The decision 
was finally made to hold legislative and then presi-
dential elections before appointing a constituent as-
sembly and drafting a new constitution. Tunisia made 
an intermediate choice and started with the drafting 
of a constitution by electing a provisional Parliament 
and President to exercise power until the adoption 
of a new constitutional text and the organisation of 
elections within six months. In any case, both coun-
tries chose to entrust the drafting of the constitution 
to an assembly composed of elected members.
In Egypt as in Tunisia, the opposition 
attempted, in vain, to limit the 
powers of the future constituent 
assembly by adopting a text of a 
“supra-constitutional” nature 
containing a certain number of 
safeguards
In Tunisia, the members of the assembly were 
elected by universal suffrage. Thanks to the parity 
principle, women obtained approximately a fourth 
of the seats. In Egypt, the 100 members of the 
Constituent Assembly were appointed by the Leg-
islative Assembly that had just been elected, but 
their designation gave rise to heated debate, once 
again due to the ambiguity of the Constitutional 
Declaration of 30 March 2011. A first Constituent 
Assembly with an Islamist majority was elected in 
March 2012 but declared unconstitutional by the 
State Council a month later because half its mem-
bers had been chosen within the Legislative As-
sembly. The second Constituent Assembly, ap-
pointed in June 2012, had more than 60% Islamists 
and only seven women. A number of pleas of un-
constitutionality were filed against this Assembly 
K
ey
s
Tr
an
si
ti
on
s 
in
 t
he
 A
ra
b 
W
or
ld
IE
M
ed
. M
ed
ite
rr
an
ea
n 
Ye
ar
bo
ok
 2
01
3
5
0
with the Supreme Constitutional Court, but Presi-
dent Morsi passed a constitutional decree on 22 
November 2012 prohibiting the constitutional 
judge from examining them. Although the Supreme 
Court had decided not to abide by this injunction 
and to meet anyway on 2 December 2012 to make 
a decision on this matter, Islamist protesters sur-
rounded the Court premises, preventing the judg-
es from entering and meeting there. The Court 
protested, denouncing such “psychological and 
material” pressure, and decided to go on strike. 
Whereas the constitutional decree of 22 Novem-
ber had likewise granted the Constituent Assem-
bly a supplementary period of two months in addi-
tion to the initial six established, the constitution 
was finally adopted in haste on 30 November, sub-
mitted to referendum on 15 December 2012 and 
adopted by a majority of approximately 64% with a 
turnout of 33%. The drafting process was so con-
troversial that the constitution had hardly been ap-
proved before a revision committee was set up to 
centralise amendment proposals for the text that 
had just been voted in. In June 2013, the Supreme 
Constitutional Court finally declared unconstitu-
tional the law organising the Constituent Assem-
bly, but the validity of the constitution was not 
challenged, due to its approbation by the people in 
the referendum.
In Tunisia, the Constituent Assembly, which in prin-
ciple was to have completed its work in a year, i.e. 
by October 2012, is taking much longer. This dif-
ference in pace vis-à-vis Egypt can be attributed in 
particular to the fact that the Tunisian Constituent 
Assembly chose to make a clean sweep with the 
past and draw up an entirely new text, whereas the 
Egyptian Constituent Assembly was deeply in-
spired by the 1971 Constitution. Another reason 
for Tunisia’s delay was that the Tunisian Constitu-
ent Assembly has also assumed the functions of a 
legislative assembly and is thus likewise in charge 
of drafting legislation and supervising the govern-
ment’s actions. The last draft of the constitution, 
which was made public on 1st June 2013, is far 
from achieving unanimity even within the Constitu-
ent Assembly and sixty of its members have signed 
a declaration expressing their opposition to the 
draft. The “Little Constitution” establishes that it 
will be submitted to referendum if it fails to pass by 
a two-thirds majority in the Constituent Assembly.
Controversies on the Role of Religion and the 
Status of Women
The rise and coming to power of political forces of 
an Islamic nature are clearly a particularly important 
trait of constitutionalism in Egypt and Tunisia, since it 
is the first time these parties have been offered the 
opportunity to draft a constitutional text and set 
down their vision of society.
In Egypt, as in Tunisia, stipulations on the role of re-
ligion and the status of women brought tensions to 
the surface both inside and outside the Constituent 
Assembly, revealing the absence of consensus in 
these societies on the definition of a set of common 
values. While in Egypt a consensus eventually 
emerged on preserving Article 2 of the 1971 Consti-
tution making Islam the religion of the State and Is-
lamic sharia the main source of legislation, in Tunisia, 
Ennahda’s proposal to introduce a similar stipulation 
into the new constitution led to such an uproar that 
the article was finally removed in March 2012. The 
current draft constitution retains the formulation of 
the 1959 Constitution, according to which “Tunisia 
is a free, independent and sovereign State; its reli-
gion is Islam, its language Arabic and its regime a 
republic.” Though this article was the object of con-
sensus basically due to its ambivalence (is Islam the 
religion of the State or the nation?), the opposition 
accused Ennahda of having betrayed their agree-
ment by introducing a new provision, according to 
which no constitutional revision can undermine “Is-
lam insofar as it is the State religion.”
In Egypt, by the same token, opposition parties ac-
cused the Muslim Brotherhood of betraying the gen-
eral consensus by introducing Article 219, under 
pressure from the Salafists; an article aiming to de-
fine the concept of “the principles of Islamic sharia” 
making recourse to highly technical notions of theol-
ogy and traditional Islamic law whose exact meaning 
only a few insiders are able to grasp. It defines the 
principles of Islamic sharia as being the scriptural 
sources of sharia, that is, the Quran and the Sunnah; 
the principles of Usul and Fiqh, that is, the major 
principles that can be surmised from the works of 
specialists in the science of the sources of Fiqh (Is-
lamic jurisprudence) and the replies given by Muslim 
jurists or Ulama; as well as sources recognised by 
Islamic Schools of Law. By adopting a very broad 
concept of “the principles of Islamic sharia,” Article 
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219 aims to bind the legislator and thwart the mod-
ernist interpretation of Article 2, passed by the Su-
preme Constitutional Court. Note that in Libya, the 
Constitutional Declaration of 3 August 2011 likewise 
established sharia as the main source of legislation.
Egypt has introduced a stipulation on blasphemy in 
its constitution. Any insults or attacks against God’s 
messengers are henceforth prohibited; legislators 
will have to define the concept more precisely and 
determine the sanction. An analogous stipulation 
prohibiting violation of the sacred was finally re-
moved from the draft constitution of Tunisia.
In any case, the fact that Islamist 
parties have agreed to become 
political parties and run in elections 
demonstrates that they agree to 
enter the realm of democratic and 
constitutional legitimacy
Stipulations on the status of women have likewise 
been the object of intense polemics in both coun-
tries. In Egypt, the Constituent Assembly took up an 
article from the 1971 Constitution requiring the 
State to ensure gender equality, without violation of 
the rules of Islamic law. In the face of reactions of 
protest by feminist NGOs, the article was eventually 
removed. Another article entrusting the State with 
ensuring the compatibility of women’s duties toward 
her family with her work that was also in the 1971 
Constitution likewise raised major concern but was 
not removed. In Tunisia, the draft constitution of Au-
gust 2012 contained an article according to which 
the State was to ensure the protection of women’s 
rights under the principle of complementarity to men 
within the family. Strong protest by the opposition 
and feminist organisations managed to have this ar-
ticle removed from the draft constitution.
In any case, the fact that Islamist parties have agreed 
to become political parties and run in elections dem-
onstrates that they agree to enter the realm of demo-
cratic and constitutional legitimacy. They are putting 
their efforts into winning elections and controlling 
the process of drawing up the new norms and not 
into reinstating a model of Islamic constitutionalism 
where the law could only be the expression of the 
will of God, the norms established in mosques would 
arise from doctrine, the power would be in the hands 
of the “holder of authority” and there would be no 
concept of State. In Egypt and Tunisia, it is in the 
constituent assembly, an institution unknown to Is-
lamic law, that the parties of political Islam are strug-
gling to pass new texts likely to strengthen the nor-
mative value of sharia. Though their programme and 
discourse is far from being liberal, they do seem to 
accept the rules of the game of democracy and have 
not as yet advocated the subordination of the politi-
cal sphere to the religious one.
The Tunisian draft constitution has also moved to-
wards a mixed regime, but where significant power 
is withdrawn from the President of the Republic to 
be placed with the Prime minister.
Granted Constitutional Changes and reform 
of the Political System
In the face of popular demand for democratic liberali-
sation and the risks of political rupture threatening 
those in power, other countries in the Arab world have 
succeeded in defusing protest movements by follow-
ing alternative routes towards democratic transition. 
They have succeeded in avoiding the escalation of 
protest to revolution by passing reforms while retain-
ing control of power. This is the case in Morocco and 
Jordan, where shortly after the onset of demonstra-
tions, the sovereigns adopted safety measures by 
modifying the constitution. These reforms, of variable 
scope, have allowed them to consolidate their power 
while protecting themselves from the fate of the Tuni-
sian and Egyptian leaders. They were granted by the 
sovereign, who retained control of the entire revision 
process. Whereas in Jordan, reform was limited to in-
troducing amendments into the constitution in force, 
in Morocco a new constitutional text replaced the 
1996 Constitution.
Constitutional Reforms Granted by Sovereigns
In both Morocco and Jordan, it was the king who took 
the initiative of revising the constitution and unilater-
ally appointing the members in charge of drafting a 
preliminary text, likewise establishing the lines of re-
form. In Morocco, it was in a speech on 9 March 2011 
that King Mohammed VI announced the implementa-
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tion of a constitutional reform and appointed a reform 
commission in charge of drafting a draft in close col-
laboration with the political parties, labour unions and 
cultural and scientific associations. On 17 June, the 
King made public the main details of the draft consti-
tution and a referendum was held on 1 July 2011. A 
veritable plebiscite for the text as well as for the King, 
the draft constitution garnered more than 98% of 
votes in favour, with a turnout of 72%, and was 
passed into law on 29 July 2011 by the King.
In April 2011, the King of Jordan also announced the 
appointment of a royal commission in charge of revis-
ing the constitution with the aim of re-establishing a 
balance of powers, allowing parliament to wholly in-
dependently carry out its legislative role and supervi-
sory role over the executive branch and strengthen-
ing the independence of the judiciary branch. The 
commission submitted its report in August 2011 and 
a month later, the two chambers passed some forty 
or so constitutional amendments.
Democracy Strengthened
In both countries, the powers of the sovereign have 
diminished to the benefit of the government and Par-
liament. In Morocco, the king made significant con-
cessions. Hence the new constitution for the first time 
requires him to choose the head of government from 
the members of the political party having won the 
most votes at the elections and no longer allows him 
to preside over the ordinary sessions of the Council of 
Government. The head of government gained new 
prerogatives, including the power to dissolve Parlia-
ment, which was previously the exclusive prerogative 
of the King, and his/her power to appoint officials to 
civilian or public positions was enhanced. The consti-
tution now distinguishes between the King as Head of 
State and the King as religious leader (commander 
of the faithful). The notion of the “sanctity” of the mon-
arch was replaced by that of the “respect” due him. 
Moreover, the new constitution steps up the power of 
parliament by expanding the sphere of legislation, 
even if the executive branch remains the legislator, in 
principle, and continues to determine the agenda for 
Parliamentary sessions. A constitutional court has also 
been created to replace the constitutional council.
In Jordan, a constitutional court has likewise been 
created, as has an independent electoral commis-
sion. Certain powers held by the King have been 
curbed, in particular his right to pass decree-laws 
under exceptional circumstances or in case of the 
absence of Parliament, and he can no longer in-
definitely postpone legislative elections. Individuals’ 
rights and liberties have been strengthened and 
torture of any sort forbidden.
Yet the King Remains at the Core of Institutions
In both Morocco and Jordan, however, the democra-
tisation is of a limited nature and has not affected the 
core of the King’s powers. The monarch’s status is 
not really affected by the restructuring of the differ-
ent institutions and he continues to play a central 
role in the political regime. The King remains the true 
holder of power, especially in Jordan, where he re-
tains significant prerogatives, including the right 
to appoint the Prime Minister, without being con-
strained to select him or her from the members of the 
majority party. In Morocco, the King remains the 
commander of the faithful and a significant actor in 
the executive branch. The government has had its 
powers stepped up, but cannot exercise them inde-
pendently of the sovereign. In both countries, the 
King retains control of the different levers of power.
Though neither of the two countries has truly insti-
tuted a constitutional monarchy, where the king 
would rule without governing, they have at least giv-
en the opposition more space. The legitimacy of the 
monarchy and the King’s place at the core of the in-
stitutional edifice were never questioned by the pro-
test movements, which did demand greater political 
liberalism, but within the framework of the existing 
monarchic regime.
Constitutional adjustments of a “Window 
dressing” nature
And finally, other countries in the Arab world have un-
dertaken constitutional adjustments that serve primar-
ily as window dressing, without their having any real 
democratic effect nor restricting the sovereign’s pow-
ers. In the majority of cases, it is the Head of State 
himself – the sultan, emir or king – who has granted 
these reforms, without even appointing a committee to 
flesh them out. Sultan Qaboos of Oman thus passed 
reforms in October 2011 amending the fundamental 
law of the sultanate to strengthen the powers of parlia-
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ment, which will now be referred bills of law by the 
Council of Ministers for their examination and revision 
before they are transmitted to the sultan, will examine 
the annual budget and proposed development plans 
and will intervene in the procedure of choosing a suc-
cessor to the throne if the ruling family cannot reach an 
agreement. Bahrain ended up making several conces-
sions, though at first it had refused to make any politi-
cal concessions and responded by armed force in 
March 2011 to protesters demanding a constitutional 
monarchy. In a speech to the nation on January 2012, 
the King called for a constitutional reform in order to 
balance out the powers by strengthening the authority 
of parliament and “opening new horizons for [Bah-
rain’s] democracy.” The chamber of representatives 
and the consultative council drew up the required 
amendments, which the King promulgated in May 
2012. The chamber of representatives’ power of su-
pervision over the government was increased. Thus it 
can now pose questions to the ministers and withdraw 
its confidence from them, in which case the conflict 
will be submitted before the King, who will choose 
whether or not to depose the Prime Minister. The 
chamber can also decide to create an investigative 
commission. Moreover, before dissolving it, the King 
will now have to consult the President of the chamber 
as well as those of the consultative assembly and of 
the constitutional court, whereas before, only the 
Prime Minister was consulted. The government is re-
quired to obtain the approval of the chamber of repre-
sentatives on its programme. It will now be the Presi-
dent of the chamber of representatives and not the 
President of the consultative assembly who will trans-
mit the bills of law that both chambers have approved 
to the Prime Minister for their promulgation. In August 
2012, the constitution was again amended to author-
ise the members of the chamber to question the min-
isters in plenary sessions and no longer only during 
commission meetings. In Qatar, the emir announced in 
November 2011 that legislative elections to elect two-
thirds of the consultative assembly, stipulated by the 
2003 Constitution and endlessly postponed since 
then, would finally be held towards the end of 2013.
Insofar as Saudi Arabia and other Gulf countries, 
they succeeded in buying social peace by granting 
material advantages funded by oil revenues, again 
launching social aid and development programmes 
and raising salaries to ease the pressure without 
making political concessions.
Syria, though in the midst of civil war, also proceeded 
to make constitutional amendments. In late 2011, 
President Bashar al-Assad thus took the initiative to 
appoint a constitutional commission comprised of 
loyalists in charge of drafting a new text. The draft was 
submitted to a referendum in February 2012, while 
the country was torn by civil war, and officially adopt-
ed by an 89% majority with a turnout of 57%. The 
amendments primarily aimed to introduce a multiparty 
system by eliminating the stipulation in the 1950 Con-
stitution that made the Baath Party the leader of the 
State and society, and to limit the president to two 
seven-year terms (as of 2014), but they maintained 
the significant prerogatives of the Head of State.
The Algerian President also undertook to introduce 
amendments to the constitution to strengthen de-
mocracy and created a constitutional commission in 
charge of making proposals to the President, but 
this promise, made in April 2011 and repeated a 
number of times since then, lacked precision and did 
not establish a timeline. On 7 April 2013, the Presi-
dent of Algeria appointed the experts of the commis-
sion entrusted with developing a constitutional 
amendment project. The commission’s conclusions 
“will then be submitted to the high appraisal of the 
President of the Republic,” who will then decide 
“the proposal’s final version, which will be subject, 
according to the nature and importance of the amen-
dments accepted, to the due procedure of constitu-
tional revision.” The absence of the President, for 
health reasons, since April 2013 will probably put 
into question this reform process.
Conclusion
Though the revision of the constitution can allow a 
balance of powers to be reinstated, constitutional 
reform is not always enough in and of itself. The in-
terpretation of the constitution is more decisive than 
the text itself. Many constitutions in force before the 
Arab Spring protected human rights on paper, but in 
practice, these rights were hindered by freedom-re-
stricting laws and were violated on a daily basis. Or-
ganic laws, designed to implement the most funda-
mental stipulations of the constitution, will allow us 
to determine whether a country is truly undergoing a 
process of democratic transition. Indeed, the legisla-
tion governing political competition and life can be 
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liberal or restrictive. Heads of State can attempt to 
control the rules of the electoral game to prevent the 
rise to power of an opposition political party with an 
absolute majority. The choice of electoral system, 
the candidacy conditions and constituency bounda-
ries allow the executive to orient the composition of 
the parliamentary assembly. Hence in Jordan and 
Kuwait, the majority of the opposition parties boy-
cotted the last legislative elections in protest against 
the reform of the electoral system, which they con-
sider prevented what would have been a definite 
electoral success for them. By establishing the con-
ditions and forms of recognition of new political par-
ties, legislation on political parties can likewise allow 
those in power to choose their opposition by refus-
ing to recognise political forces that could threaten 
to take their place. Thus, in Tunisia, it was only in 
March 2012 that the first Salafist party was recog-
nised. By the same token, the law on the organisa-
tion of the judicial branch should provide greater 
guarantees of the independence of the judiciary, and 
legislation on the media (including the press) should 
guarantee equal access for all media. In Morocco, 
the constitution establishes a constitutional court in 
charge of examining pleas of unconstitutionality of 
laws arising during trials before the ordinary courts. 
But it also stipulates that the specific organisation of 
the conditions of admissibility of challenges to the 
constitutional court is governed by an organic law. 
Everything will thus depend on how liberal or restric-
tive the content of these criteria of admissibility are. 
By the same token, the manner in which the stipula-
tions of the constitution regarding religion will be 
implemented is fundamental. Whereas the religious 
issue has held great significance in constitutional 
debates, the real influence Islam will exercise insofar 
as a State religion, or that sharia will have insofar as 
a source of law will depend on the manner in which 
the constitutional norms regarding them are inter-
preted and applied.
Conversely, certain countries have modified their 
political laws before amending the constitution or 
without touching it altogether. Thus, though Libya 
has not yet adopted its constitution, new laws have 
been passed since late 2011 to hold legislative 
elections, establish an independent electoral com-
mission and eliminate the penalty for belonging to a 
political party. A law on political parties was also 
passed in April 2012. By the same token, in Sep-
tember 2011 in Saudi Arabia, the king unilaterally 
modified the law on the organisation of the Consul-
tative Council, deciding to reserve at least 20% of 
the 150 seats for women. Upon applying this revi-
sion, in January 2013, he appointed 30 women to 
the Consultative Council. He likewise decided that 
women can vote and be candidates in municipal 
elections as of 2015.
Though the constitution is a tool for political change, 
it remains an essentially symbolic document that re-
quires implementation by both legislators and con-
stitutional judges. The creation in numerous States 
of real constitutional courts is, in this regard, a par-
ticularly significant development and an additional 
step towards strengthening constitutionalism in 
countries in the region.
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